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Uniform-Price Mechanism Design for a Large Population of
Dynamic Agents
Sen Li, Wei Zhang, Jianming Lian, and Karanjit Kalsi
Abstract— This paper focuses on the coordination of a large
population of dynamic agents with private information over
multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility,
while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve
group objectives. The coordination problem is formulated as a
dynamic mechanism design problem. A mechanism is proposed
based on the competitive equilibrium of the large population
game. We derive the conditions for the general nonlinear
dynamic systems under which the proposed mechanism is
incentive compatible and can implement the social choice
function in ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium. In addition, the
proposed mechanism is applied to a linear quadratic problem
with bounded parameters to show its efficacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design deals with the coordination of a group
of self-interested agents to achieve group objectives [1].
In a mechanism design problem, the coordinator needs to
provide proper incentives to align the individual preferences
with the social choice, i.e., the strategic behaviors of the
self-interested agents result in an outcome that achieves the
desired group objectives. Such problem has been extensively
studied by researchers in both engineering and economics
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Some of these works consider the
coordination problem in dynamic setting [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13]. While these existing works guarantee incentive
compatibility and realize efficient resource allocation, they
typically lead to discriminatory pricing schemes: the unit
price of the mechanism is different for different agents.
Such pricing scheme is not applicable in many applications,
including the existing electricity market.
On the other hand, uniform-price mechanisms draw ex-
tensive research attentions due to its wide applicability in
engineering problems. Many works study the design of
uniform-price incentive mechanisms for price-taking agents
[14], [15], [16] who do not anticipate the effect of his bid
on the market clearing price. While intuitively the effect
of individual agent actions on market price may vanish
if the population grows large, the price-taker assumption
requires a more rigorous justification. In the case where
the agents are not treated as price-takers, the interactions
between agent decisions make it challenging to even analyze
the game solutions of a given mechanism. One branch of
works studies the decentralized convergence to the solution
of some given mechanisms using mean-field approximations
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[17], [18], [19], [20], [21], assuming that the agents are
indifferent to a change in his utility up to a constant. While
such method proposes a way to efficiently compute the game
solutions, it does not involve group objectives. In contrast,
another branch of works designs mechanisms that take group
objectives into account [22], [23], [24]. In these works,
proper pricing schemes are proposed to motivate agents to
achieve or approximately achieve socially optimal resource
allocations. However, most of these works focus on static
mechanism design, where system dynamics are not involved.
In this paper we consider the coordination of a large
population of dynamic agents to achieve group objectives
over multiple periods. Each individual agent is self-interested
and strategically chooses control actions to maximize his
utility. In the meanwhile, the coordinator needs to provide
proper incentives (typically via pricing) for individual agents
to achieve certain group objectives, i.e., maximize the social
welfare. This problem poses several challenges: first, we
focus on uniform-price mechanisms, where the agents face
a single-valued unit price. No existing tool in mechanism
design is directly applicable in this scenario. Second, to
identify the optimal mechanism that maximizes the social
welfare, a subproblem is to determine the solution of the
game induced by a given mechanism. This problem is
challenging, especially when large-scale coupled dynamic
systems are involved. Existing works mostly focus on mean
field control [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], where the coordina-
tor’s control is typically fixed as the average of individual
states or controls. In this case, since the higher level control is
fixed (not optimized), the resulting solution can not guarantee
to achieve the group objectives. Therefore, a more general
framework that addresses other control scenarios is needed.
The key contribution of this work lies in identifying a class
of problems where uniform price mechanism can be devel-
oped to implement he social choice function in ǫ-dominant
strategy equilibrium. This class of problems captures a wide
range of resource allocation problems where the coordinator
allocates resource to a large population of dynamic agents
to maximize the social welfare subject to a peak resource
constraint. Despite its wide applicability, no existing tools in
mechanism design literature can be directly used to design a
uniform-price mechanism for this particular problem. In this
paper, we propose a uniform-price mechanism to achieve the
group objectives. We show that when the impact of individual
bid on the market clearing price is bounded, the proposed
mechanism is incentive compatible for general nonlinear
dynamic systems. We also derived conditions under which
the proposed mechanism can implement the social choice
function in ε-dominant strategy equilibrium. Furthermore,
the proposed mechanism is applied to a linear quadratic
cases. We show that as long as the system parameters are
properly bounded, the conditions for incentive compatibility
can be verified, and the proposed mechanism maximizes the
social welfare in ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The coor-
dination problem is formulated as a dynamic mechanism
design problem in Section II. A uniform-price mechanism
is proposed in Section III. In Section IV a special case is
studied to show the efficacy of the proposed approach.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we formulate the coordination problem
as a mechanism design problem. Each agent is modeled
as an individual utility maximizer who chooses a bid to
optimize individual utility over a planning horizon. In the
meanwhile, the coordinator needs to design the message
space and market clearing rules (mechanism) to motivate the
self-interested agents to achieve group objectives.
A. Individual Utility Maximization
Consider a group of N agents with a planning horizon
of length K . Let xik and aik denote the system state and
control action of the ith agent at kth period, respectively.
We consider the following discrete time dynamic systems
with constraint: 

xik+1 = fi(x
i
k, a
i
k; θ
i
k)
aik ∈ Ω
i
k
xik ∈ X
i
k
(1)
where θik ∈ Θi denotes the private information of agent
i, Ωik and X ik are convex and compact set, and fi is
assumed to be continuous with respect to both parameters.
In the mechanism design context, the private information
is typically referred to as the agent type. In the individual
decision problem, each agent acts strategically to maximize
the individual utility, which is the valuation minus the
payment. The user’s valuation can be captured by a stage-
additive valuation function V ik : X ik × Ωik → R, which is
assumed to be continuously differentiable and strictly convex
with respect to aik ∈ Ωik. It evaluates the level of comfort
the agent experiences when receiving an allocation decision
aik ∈ Ω
i
k at state x
i
k ∈ X
i
k. Let pk denote the unit price of
the allocation at time k, then the utility of the ith agent can
be denoted as follows:
K∑
k=1
U ik(x
i
k, a
i
k, pk; θ
i
k) =
K∑
k=1
V ik (x
i
k, a
i
k; θ
i
k)− pka
i
k (2)
Since the agents are self-interested, each agent would choose
control actions to maximize his utility subject to the dynamic
constraint (1).
Remark 1: In the above formulation, the unit price
pk is the same to different agents. This is called the
non-discriminatory pricing. The non-discriminatory pricing
scheme is compatible with many existing markets, and is
easy to implement. On the other hand, many existing works
are based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [1],
[3], [25], which typically leads to discriminatory pricing.
The uniform-price mechanism design problem (especially the
dynamic case) is not well studied yet.
B. The Mechanism Design Problem
Since the agents have private information, the coordinator
asks each agent to submit a bid denoted as ri = (ri1, . . . , riL).
This bid must be in the message space, M i, specified by
the coordinator. The coordinator then collects these bids and
determines the market outcome accordingly, which consists
of the allocation decision a = (a1, . . . , aK) and the unit
price p = (p1, . . . , pK), where ak = (a1k, . . . , aNk ). This
market clearing process maps the agent bids to the market
outcome, which can be modeled as an outcome function g :
M1 × · · · ×MN → Ω × P , where Ω denotes all feasible
resource allocations and P denotes all feasible unit prices. A
mechanism consists of the message space and the outcome
function, whose formal definition is given below:
Definition 1 (Mechanism [1]): A mechanism
Γ = (M, g(·)) consists of a collection of message spaces M
and an outcome function g(·), where M =M1×· · ·×MN .
Based on the definition, the outcome function can be
written as g(r) = (a1, . . . , aN , p). For notation convenience,
we denote gik,a(r) = aik and gk,p(r) = pk, and let ga(r) =
(a1, . . . , aN ). In our problem, when a mechanism is given,
the utility function of each agent depends on the bid, and
can be written as the following:
K∑
k=1
U ik(x
i
k, g
i
k,a(r), gk,p(r); θ
i
k). (3)
As each agent is self-interested, he would choose his bid to
maximizes the individual utility (3). In the utility function
(3), since r is the vector consisting of all agent bids, each
agent’s utility depends on the actions of other agents. There-
fore, this utility maximization problem is a game induced by
the mechanism Γ, which can be denoted as G(Γ). For a game
problem, there are several solution concepts, including Nash
equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy
equilibrium, etc [1]. In this paper we choose the ǫ-dominant
strategy equilibrium solution concept, which assumes that
each agent is indifferent to a change in his utility up to
a constant ǫ. In reality, a utility of 0.99$ may have no
difference from a utility of 1$ to an agent. Therefore, this
assumption is reasonable in many practical applications. If
we let Λik(r) = (gik,a(r), gk,p(r)), then the stage utility of
the ith agent at time k can be written as a function of Λik(r)
only (neglecting the dependence on initial state). Using these
notations, the formal definition of the ǫ-dominant strategy
equilibrium is given as below:
Definition 2: Given a game G(Γ), a bidding collection
r∗ = (r1∗, . . . , rN∗) is an ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium
of the game if for any i = 1, . . . , N , we have:
K∑
k=1
U ik(Λ
i
k(r
i∗, r−i); θik) ≥
K∑
k=1
U ik(Λ
i
k(r
i, r−i); θik)−ǫ (4)
for all ri ∈ M i and all r−i ∈ M−i, where M−i = M1 ×
· · · ×M i−1 ×M i+1 × · · · ×MN .
In the equilibrium solution, it is to the agent’s best benefit
to follow the equilibrium strategy regardless of other agent’s
actions. Note that the equilibrium strategy depends on user
types, the individual decision making process can be cap-
tured by a bidding strategy miΓ : Θi →M i. In this notaion,
mΓ(θ) = (m
1
Γ, (θ
1) . . . ,mNΓ (θ
N )) is the game solution to
G(Γ).
Remark 2: The dominant strategy equilibrium solution is
a rather robust solution concept. In dominant strategy equilib-
rium, each agent’s best decision is to follow the equilibrium
strategy regardless of the actions of other agents. Therefore,
when an individual agent makes a bidding decision, he does
not need to anticipate the control actions of other agents.
However, it is well-known that in general, VCG mechanism
is the unique mechanism that induces dominant strategy
equilibrium [1], which does not guarantee uniform unit price.
Therefore, different from many existing works, we adopt the
ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium. In this solution concept, a
uniform-price mechanism (different from VCG) is proposed
to implement the desired social choice function for large-
population agents.
The goal of this paper is to find the mechanism that
achieves the group objective. The group objective can be
encoded in a social choice function φ : Θ1× · · ·×ΘN → Ω
that maps the agent type to a feasible resource allocation.
Here we consider the social choice function that maximizes
the social welfare subject to a total resource constraint:
φ(θ) = argmax
a
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
V ik (x
i
k, a
i
k; θ
i
k)−
K∑
k=1
σk
( N∑
i=1
aik
)
s.t.


xik+1 = fi(x
i
k, a
i
k; θ
i
k)
aik ∈ Ω
i
k∑N
i=1 a
i
k ≤ Dk ∀k
In the above definition, Dk is the total resource constraint,
and σk(·) is a convex and continuously differentiable func-
tion denoting the cost for the coordinator to procure certain
amount of resources at time k. The value of the social choice
function indicates the socially desired resource allocation. On
the other hand, the resource allocation is a function of the
user bids, which depends on the mechanism. Therefore, to
achieve the group objective, the coordinator needs to find a
mechanism whose resulting allocation plan coincides with
the value of the social choice function.
Definition 3 (Implementation [1]): The mechanism Γ im-
plements the social choice function φ(·) if there exists an
equilibrium strategy profile (m1Γ(·), . . . ,mNΓ (·)) of the game
G(Γ) such that
ga(m
1
Γ(θ1), . . . ,m
N
Γ (θN )) = φ(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. (5)
where Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×ΘN .
To this point, the problem of this paper can be stated as
follows: design a uniform-price mechanism to implement the
social choice function φ(·) in ǫ-dominant strategy equilib-
rium..
III. THE UNIFORM-PRICE MECHANISM
In this section, we first propose a mechanism based on
the competitive equilibrium of the market. Then, we show
that the proposed mechanism can implement the social
choice function when each agent strategically chooses bid
to maximize individual utilities. Due to revelation principle,
we focus on the direct mechanism, where the message space
is the space of agent types, i.e., M i = Θi for ∀i.
A. The Proposed Mechanism
To introduce our proposed mechanism, let us first consider
a price-response problem, where each agent takes price
as given and chooses optimal control ai to maximize the
individual utility. In the price-response problem, the control
strategy of each agent depends on the price. Therefore, we
have the following:
µi(p, ri) = argmax
ai
K∑
k=1
U ik(x
i
k, a
i
k, pk; r
i
k) (6)
s.t.
{
xik+1 = fi(x
i
k, a
i
k; r
i
k)
aik ∈ Ω
i
k.
where ui is assumed to be continuous with respect to
p. In the context of economics, the price-allocation pair
(p, µ1(p, ri), . . . , µN (p, ri)) is defined as the competitive
equilibrium [1]. Here we propose a mechanism Γc based on
the competitive equilibrium concept to solve the mechanism
design problem of this paper.
Definition 4: The proposed mechanism Γc is a direct
mechanism with the following outcome function:

gp(r) = argmaxp
∑N
i=1
∑K
k=1 V
i
k (x
i∗
k , a
i∗
k ; r
i
k)−∑K
k=1 σk
(∑N
i=1 a
i∗
k
)
s.t.


xi∗k+1 = fi(x
i∗
k , a
i∗
k ; r
i
k)
ai∗ = µi(p, ri)∑N
i=1 a
i∗
k ≤ Dk, ∀k
ai∗k ∈ Ω
i
k
gia(r) = µ
i(gp(r), r
i).
where gia(r) = (gi1,a(r), . . . , giK,a(r)) and gp(r) =
(g1,p(r), . . . , gK,p(r)). In the above definition, the utility
function is a continuous function with respect to p over
a compact set. Therefore, gp(r) exists, and the proposed
mechanism is well-defined.
Remark 3: In this paper, we assume that µi is continuous
with respect to p, which establishes the existence of gp(r). It
is well known that the solution to a strictly convex parametric
quadratic programming problem is continuous with respect
to its parameters [26]. Therefore, this continuity assumption
holds when U ik is quadratic and fi is linear. We believe
this assumption also holds for more general systems, but
the derivation of the detailed conditions that guarantee the
continuity of µi is out of the scope of this paper.
Remark 4: Note that although the mechanism is defined
based on the price-taker game (6), we do not assume that
agents are price-taker. In our problem, each agent will antic-
ipate the impact of his bid on the market clearing price, and
makes bidding decisions accordingly. This is significantly
different from the works based on competitive equilibrium
[14], [22], [23]. On the other hand, we conjecture that the
impact of the bids of an individual agent on the market price
will diminish as the population size grows. In this case the
agent behavior should be very similar to price-taker agents
when the game has a large population. The rest of this section
provides rigorous justification for this conjecture.
B. Properties of the Proposed Mechanism
This subsection discusses some properties of the proposed
mechanism.
In mechanism design problems, the coordinator typically
wants to design a mechanism to induce the truth-telling
solution (ri = θi). If truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy
of the game induced by a direct mechanism, we say this
mechanism is incentive compatible. The formal definition of
incentive compatibility is as follows:
Definition 5 (Incentive Compatibility [1]): A direct
mechanism Γ is incentive compatible in ǫ-dominant strategy
equilibrium if for any i = 1, . . . , N , we have:
K∑
k=1
U ik(Λ
i
k(θ
i, r−i); θik) ≥
K∑
k=1
U ik(Λ
i
k(r
i, r−i); θik)− ǫ (7)
for all ri ∈M i and all r−i ∈M−i.
Under certain conditions, we can show that the proposed
mechanism is incentive compatible in ǫ-dominant strategy
equilibrium. To present our result, we first introduce some
regularity conditions.
Definition 6: We say a function ϕ : Rk → R is Lipschitz
continuous with constant C in L∞ norm for x ∈ X , if there
exists C > 0 such that:
|ϕ(x1)− ϕ(x2)| ≤ C||x1 − x2||∞, ∀x1 ∈ X, x2 ∈ X (8)
Throughout the rest of the paper, whenever we say a
function is Lipschitz continuous with constant C, we mean
the function is Lipschitz continuous with constant C in L∞
norm for its parameters in the corresponding space.
The incentive compatibility result of the proposed mech-
anism can be summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Assume that U ik is Lipschitz continuous
with respect to both aik and pik with constant C1 and C2,
respectively. Assume µi is Lipchitz continuous with respect
to p with constant C3. Furthermore, assume that there exists
ǫ1 > 0 for the proposed mechanism Γc such that:
|gk,p(r
i, r−i)−gk,p(θ
i, r−i)| ≤ ǫ1, ∀r
i ∈M i, r−i ∈M−i,
(9)
then Γc is incentive compatible in ǫ-dominant strategy equi-
librium where ǫ = K(C1C3 + C2)ǫ1.
Proof: Let ri denote the bids of the ith agent. Let
p∗k = gk,p(r). According to the definition of the proposed
mechanism Γc, for each agent i, we have the following:
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(p
∗
k, r
i), p∗k; r
i
)
≥
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(p
∗
k, r˜
i), p∗k; r
i
)
(10)
for all r˜i ∈ M i. Due to the Lipschitz continuity and the
assumption (9) of the proposition, it can be verified that the
following inequality holds:
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r
i, r−i), r˜i), gk,p(r
i, r−i); ri
)
+ ǫ ≥
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r˜
i, r−i), r˜i), gk,p(r˜
i, r−i); ri
) (11)
for all r˜i ∈ M i and r−i ∈ M−i, where ǫ = K(C1C3 +
C2)ǫ1. Equation (10) and (11) together indicate the follow-
ing:
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r
i, r−i), ri), gk,p(r
i, r−i); ri
)
≥
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r˜
i, r−i), r˜i), gk,p(r˜
i, r−i); ri
)
− ǫ (12)
for all r˜i ∈ M i and r−i ∈ M−i. Therefore, the proposed
mechanism guarantees that the agent bid r satisfies the above
condition (12).
On the other hand, the ith agent seeks to find a bid ri
such that:
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r
i, r−i), θi), gk,p(r
i, r−i); θi
)
≥
K∑
k=1
U ik
(
µik(gp(r˜
i, r−i), r˜i), gk,p(r˜
i, r−i); θi
)
− ǫ (13)
for all r˜i ∈ M i and r−i ∈ M−i. Letting ri = θi exactly
satisfies this objective. This completes the proof.
Proposition 1 provides conditions under which the pro-
posed mechanism is incentive compatible. Aside from Lip-
schitz continuity, the key condition is (9): the bid of a
particular agent will affect the market clearing price by
at most ǫ1. While the result of Proposition 1 works for
general nonlinear dynamic systems, how to verify condition
(9) depends on the particular application. In the next section
we will show how this condition can be verified for linear
quadratic problems. The verification of this condition for
more general systems is left for future work.
In our paper, since the mechanism is designed based on
the competitive equilibrium, which deviates from the true
agent behavior, incentive compatibility does not necessarily
guarantee the group objective can be achieved. To account
for this, we first introduce the following definition before
proceeding to the key result of this paper.
Definition 7: Given a resource allocation a, we say a is
uniform-price implementable if there exists a price p ∈ P
such that ai = µi(p, θi) for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Based on the definition, if a resource allocation a is uniform-
price implementable by p, then (a, p) is a competitive
equilibrium of the game. Now we can present the key result
of this paper:
Proposition 2: Assume that the social choice function
φ(θ) is uniform-price implementable, and the proposed
mechanism Γc is incentive compatible in ǫ-dominant strat-
egy equilibrium, then Γc can implement the social choice
function φ(θ) in ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proof: On one hand, based on Definition 4, the pro-
posed mechanism Γc renders an optimal resource allocation
among all uniform-price implementable allocations. There-
fore, the resulting social welfare is no less than that of the
desired social choice function φ(θ).
On the other hand, the social choice function is the team
problem for the proposed mechanism Γ [27], [28]. Therefore,
it provides an upper bound for attainable social welfare for
Γ. This completes the proof.
IV. THE LINEAR QUADRATIC CASE
In this section, we derive the conditions under which
the proposed mechanism can achieve the group objective in
linear quadratic problems.
Based on Proposition 2, to achieve the group objective,
the following conditions need to be verified: first, the so-
cial choice function should be uniform-price implementable;
second, the propose mechanism Γc needs to be incentive
compatible. In the rest of this section, we will introduce the
problem setup and check these two conditions in this setup.
A. Problem Setup
Let us consider the following linear scalar system for the
ith agent:
xik+1 = A
ixik +B
i
ka
i
k (14)
where xik ∈ R denotes the state and aik ∈ R is the input. We
assume that 0 < A ≤ Ai ≤ A¯ and B ≤ Bi ≤ B¯ < 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , N . This linear model captures various dynamic
assets, including batteries, PEVs, thermostatically controlled
loads (with proper control strategy), among others.
Let (di1, . . . , diK) be the desired state trajectory for agent
i. Consider a valuation function of quadratic form that
penalizes the deviation from this desired sequence. The
individual utility can be written as follows:
K∑
k=1
U ik(x
i
k, a
i
k, pk; θ
i
k) =
K∑
k=1
βik(x
i
k − d
i
k)
2 − pka
i
k (15)
where θik = (Ai, Bi, βi, di). Note that Bi denotes a vector,
and the same applies to other time-varying parameters.
In this setup, the social choice function has the following
form:
φLQ(θ) = argmax
a
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
βik(x
i
k − d
i
k)
2 −
K∑
k=1
σk
( N∑
i=1
aik
)
(16)
s.t.
{
xik+1 = A
ixik +B
i
ka
i
k∑N
i=1 a
i
k ≤ Dk ∀k
where βik < 0 for all i and k. For sake of analysis, we
assume that the function σk has a linear structure, i.e.,
σk(
∑N
i=1 a
i
k) = p
w
k (
∑N
i=1 a
i
k). In electricity market, pwk is
the wholesale energy price.
B. Uniform-price Implementability
In this subsection we show that the social choice function
φLQ(·) is uniform-price implementable.
Proposition 3: The social choice function φLQ(·) is
uniform-price implementable, i.e., for any report r, there
exists a price pc such that φiLQ(r) = µi(pc, ri) for ∀i =
1, . . . , N , where φiLQ(r) is the allocation to the ith agent.
Proof: First, under a given price pc, the optimality
conditions for the price-response problem (6) are as follows:
−
K∑
k=1
∂V ik (x
i
k)
∂aik
∣∣∣
ai
k
=µi
k
(pc,ri)
+ pck = 0, (17)
On the other hand, the social welfare maximization problem
(16) is convex. The necessary and sufficient optimality
condition is that there exists a unique multiplier ξk, such
that:
−
K∑
k=1
∂V ik (x
i
k)
∂aik
∣∣∣
ai
k
=φi,k
LQ
(r)
+ pwk + ξk = 0, (18)
where φi,kLQ(r) is the allocation to the ith agent at time k, and
ξk is non-negative and satisfies ξk(
∑N
i=1 φ
i,k
LQ(r) −D) = 0
for all k = 1, . . . ,K . Let pck = pwk +ξk. It can be verified that
φiLQ(r) = µ
i(pc, ri) is a solution to (17). Since the price-
response problem is convex, optimality condition (17) is both
necessary and sufficient. This indicates that pck = pwk + ξk
can implement the social choice function, which completes
the proof.
The result of Proposition 3 shows that there exists a price to
implement the social choice function φLQ(·). In addition to
this, we can also derive the conditions for this price, which
can be summarized as the following corollary:
Corollary 1: The price pc satisfies φiLQ(r) = µi(pc, ri)
for all i = 1, . . . , N if and only if the following condition
holds for all k = 1, . . . ,K:{
p˜ck = p
w
k if
∑N
i µ
i
k(p
c, ri) < Dk
p˜ck ≥ p
w
k if
∑N
i µ
i
k(p
c, ri) = Dk
(19)
This result can be directly derived from the proof of Propo-
sition 3. We comment that the result holds when σk(·) is
nonlinear. In this case, pwk is the marginal cost for obtaining
certain amount of resources.
C. Incentive Compatibility
Now we verify the incentive compatibility of the proposed
mechanism based on Proposition 1. First, we observe that
under the linear quadratic setup, utility function U ik is
Lipschitz continuous with respect to both aik and pik for a
bounded domain. To verify the Lipschitz continuity of the
function µi, we observe that the analytic expression of µi
can be derived for the linear quadratic case:{
µik(p
c, ri) = θikp
c
k + θ
i
k,k−1p
c
k−1 + θ
i
k,k+1p
c
k+1, ∀k 6= 1
µi1(p
c, ri) = θi1p
c
1 + θ
i
2p
c
2
where θi1 = A
i
2βi
1
Bi
1
Bi
1
, θi2 = −
Ai
2βi
1
Bi
1
BI
2
, and the coefficients
for k 6= 1 are defined as follows:

θik =
1
2βikB
i
kB
i
k
+
AiAi
2βik−1B
i
kB
i
k
θik,k−1 = −
Ai
2βik−1B
i
k−1B
i
k
θik,k+1 = −
Ai
2βikB
i
kB
i
k+1
,
(20)
Since the function µi is linear with respect to pc, it is
Lipschitz continuous. In addition to Lipschitz continuity, we
can also show that condition (9) holds for the linear quadratic
case.
Proposition 4: In the linear quadratic setup, there exists
C4 > 0 (not depending on N ) for the proposed mechanism
Γc such that:
|gk,p(r
i, r−i)−gk,p(θ
i, r−i)| ≤ C4/N, ∀r
i ∈M i, r−i ∈M−i,
(21)
Proof: To prove this result, we need to study how agent
bid affects the price. The price and the agent bids satisfy
(19). This optimality condition can be transformed into the
following equation ν(p, ri) = 0, where p is the root of the
mapping ν : P ×M i → P , and this mapping can be defined
as follows:
νk(p, r
i) =
{
α1k(
∑N
i=1 µ
i
k(p, r
i)−Dk), if pk ≥ σ′(Dk)
α2k(pk − σ
′(
∑N
i=1 µ
i
k(p, r
i))), otherwise
(22)
where νk is the kth element of vector ν.
Let Jνp and Jνr be the Jacobian matrix of ν with respect
to p and ri, respective. If Jνp is invertible, then p is a
function of ri (if not, ri does not affect p, and the result
of the proposition holds). Let Jpr be the Jacobian matrix
of p with respect to ri and we have Jpr = −(Jνp)−1Jνr,
whenever Jνp exists. Based on (20), since the report ri are
bounded, each entry of the matrix Jνr is bounded, and there
exists C5 > 0 and C6 > 0 such that C5N ≤
∣∣ ∂νk
∂pk′
∣∣ ≤ C6N
for all k and k′ where pk ≥ σ′(D). Due to the particular
structure of Jνp, we can derive the analytic form for (Jνp)−1
and verify that each entry of this matrix is also bounded.
Therefore, there exists C7 not depending on N such that∣∣∂pk
∂ril
∣∣ ≤ C7/N . Since ri is bounded, this indicates that there
exists m > 0 not depending on N , such that:
|gk,p(r
i, r−i)− gk,p(θ
i, r−i)| ≤
L∑
l=1
∣∣∂pk
∂ril
dril
∣∣ ≤ LmC7
N
,
(23)
where L is the dimension of the user bid ri. In this case,
C4 = LmC7, which completes the proof.
To this point, all the conditions for Proposition 1 are
verified. Therefore, the proposed mechanism is incentive
compatible. Furthermore, since the social choice function
φLQ is uniform-price implementable, we conclude that the
mechanism Γc implements the social choice function φLQ
in ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a dynamic mechanism design ap-
proach for the coordinator of a large population agents
with private information. A mechanism was proposed to
motivate self-interested agents to achieve group objectives.
We showed that the proposed mechanism is incentive com-
patible, and it implements the desired social choice function
in ǫ-dominant strategy equilibrium. We also applied the
proposed mechanism to linear quadratic case to show its effi-
cacy. Future work includes developing the mechanism design
framework for more general dynamic models, and applying
the results to practical applications such as thermostatically
controlled loads, plug-in electric vehicles, dyers, washers,
among others.
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